The issue of how to organize and implement a European security and defence 'identity' has been discussed at both the political and the academic level throughout the past decade. Initially, it was basically related only to NATO or, at best, to the NATO-WEU interface. As such, it did not make much progress, in spite of the commitments taken especially in Berlin (1996) and the limited decisions adopted in the WEU framework in 1997. Even at that time, the main bones of contention were the extent to which NATO 'assets and capabilities' would be put at the disposal of 'European-led' peace support operations and, as a consequence, the role and the rights of those European allies that were not full members of the WEU. With the onset of the ESDP and the de facto withering away of the WEU, the issue has become a bilateral one between the European Union and the Alliance. The controversial points have remained more or less the same, but the political and legal contexts have changed. Ever since, apparently, the main obstacle to an arrangement between the two organizations allowing the EU to have 'assured access' to NATO planning capabilities has been Turkey's attitude. The article examines in detail all the problems involved, assessing the current state of affairs and drawing some conclusions for the future.
Introduction
HE HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL that, in December 1999, formally launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) made it clear that, among the many requirements of a credible crisis management capability, a clearly defined relationship with NATO was necessary and urgent. In fact, once it was decided -six months earlier, in Cologne -to do away with the Western European Union (WEU), the need to find both a workable modus vivendi and a compatible modus operandi with the Atlantic Alliance became increasingly pressing. The link to NATO was all the more necessary for it was commonly assumed that the EU would hardly be able (or perhaps willing) to undertake on its own military operations at the 'high end' of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks', now incorporated in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
1 Besides, most EU members felt it unpractical and even counterproductive -both politically and operationally, let alone in terms of available resources -to end up having a dual set of military planning structures, one for NATO and one for the ESDP. Finally, EU relations with NATO impinged upon and were influenced by transatlantic relations at large, and US reactions to the onset of the ESDP suggested that some initial misunderstandings had better be corrected through clear and transparent arrangements between the two Brussels-based organizations. Until then, in fact, the EU as such had developed official relations with the USAcovering almost exclusively EC-related affairs -but not with the Alliance. Ever since, bilateral contacts (starting with regular 'working breakfasts' between the two Secretaries-General, Robertson and Solana) have increased and led to concrete negotiations aimed at laying down the modalities for the lease, use and return of NATO assets and capabilities for 'EU-led' operations. In the autumn of 2001, however, such negotiations were still stuck, in spite of repeated efforts made especially by British diplomats to overcome Turkey's objections. Ankara argued, in particular, that the arrangements under discussion did not comply with Alliance deliberations and did not offer adequate guarantees to non-EU European allies, especially compared with those awarded by the WEU. But what are (were) the 'rights' that Turkey claimed to have acquired through its Associate Membership of the WEU, and how did they relate to the ESDP?
The Legacy of the WEU (and the ESDI) Associate Membership is one of four different types of membership status in the WEU that, as a whole, constitute the so-called WEU 'family of nations' (a total of 28). Associate Members, namely Iceland, Norway and Turkey, obtained this status through an invitation issued in Declaration No. 30 on the WEU attached to the Maastricht Treaty in late 1991, which called for the non-EU European NATO members to become WEU Associate Members. The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Declaration on Associate Membership became effective in 1995. Subsequently, the status of Associated Members evolved through a number of Ministerial Declarations and Permanent Council decisions. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland acquired this status following a decision taken by the WEU Permanent Council on 23 March 1999, and their new status was confirmed by a declaration attached to the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers dated 10-11 May 1999. As a result, the WEU now has six Associate Members. 2 Associate Members are not signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty (mBT) or the WEU Treaty. Their status concerns only non-Article V mBT activities.
Council, its working groups and subsidiary bodies, although on two conditions: (1) their participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the mBT, and (2) a majority of member-states (or half of the member-states including the presidency) may request that participation be restricted to Full Members of the WEU. The first condition means that only Full Members have voting rights on matters related to the scope of the Treaty: Associate Members have the right to speak and submit proposals but not the right to block a decision that is subject to consensus among the ten Full Members. The second condition means that the desires of one or even four Full Members are not sufficient to exclude Associate Members from a meeting they are in principle entitled to attend. In real WEU life since 1995, most meetingsincluding those of the Permanent Council -have been held with 13 (16 since 1999), 18, or even 28 members. Some, however, have been held with 10.
In addition, Associate Members are (or rather were, until June 2001) associated to the WEU Planning Cell through special arrangements -one of which being notably with Turkey -and can appoint liaison officers. From the operational angle, they are entitled to take part on the same basis as the Full Members in WEU military operations (as well as exercises and planning) to which they commit forces. They can also earmark and nominate Forces Answerable to the WEU on the same basis as the Full Members. Furthermore, by virtue of their NATO membership, Associate Members are also entitled to be consulted and informed on WEU operations in which they are interested, and to be directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are used, within the framework of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. This arrangement clearly was part of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) as defined since 1994, and considered all forces employed in a 'WEU-led' operation as 'separable but not separate' -in terms of status and substance -from those answerable to the Alliance at large. 4 Furthermore, before the organization's reduction to the so-called 'residual' WEU in July 2001, Associate Members were connected to the telecommunications system WEUCOM, involved in the operations of the Satellite Centre and regularly informed about space activities. Turkey and Norway also participated in Working Groups that had decisionmaking at 13 members (all bar the Security Committee), such as the Transatlantic Forum, Eurocom, Eurolongterm and the Logistics Group (WELG). As for the former Eurogroup, now the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), WEU Associate Members still have full rights and responsibilities. 5 Finally, in the WEU Assembly -still in place as a Treatybased body -Members of Parliament from Associate Members are entitled to fully participate in Committees, to act as co-Rapporteurs, and to vote on Reports, though not on the Assembly's budget. However, Associate Members have acquired the right/obligation to contribute financially to the WEU budget, and that according to a predetermined key. Neither Observers (non-allied EU members) nor Associate Partners have that right/obligation -they are only required to contribute to those military operations to which they commit forces -and, more generally, their level of participation in Working Groups and operational activities is also lower. Such a provision reflects better than anything the special consideration given to NATO members within the WEU: in fact, the organization was for a long time closely connected to the Alliance. Only with the Maastricht Treaty did it acquire some link to the EU (Article J.4.2), which was later strengthened with the Amsterdam Treaty clause whereby the EU could 'avail itself' of the WEU (Article 17.3), thus creating a sort of 'agency' or subordinated role that was not envisaged for the WEU at the outset. By virtue of the TEU, in fact, the status of the Observers within the WEU has been gradually upgraded since July 1997, yet without their ever attaining the same rights as the Associate Members because of their lack of NATO membership (Denmark's special case apart). 7 As EU members, however, they enjoy(ed) full political control over those activities in which the WEU might act in an 'agency' role.
To sum up, it is fair to say that, between 1995 and 1999, Associate Membership of the WEU awarded European NATO members -and especially Norway and Turkey -privileged access to and generous participation rights in WEU activities. Those arrangements, however, were not Treaty-based and never went as far as to give the Associate Members shared political control. They were mostly limited to the operational components of WEU activitiesalthough they included 'military planning' at large -and were based on the assumption that the WEU would act as an interface between the EU and NATO for non-Article V mBT/Article 17.2 TEU missions, in other words the 'Petersberg tasks'.
Actually, the first compelling test of the scope of those arrangements came in 1996-98 during the negotiations on the so-called 'Berlin-plus' framework, most notably when scenarios for 'WEU-led' CJTF operations were discussed. After months of diplomatic skirmishes over the extent to which Turkey, in particular, would be involved in the preparation and planning of such operations, a preliminary deal was reached in April 1997 on a compromise proposal put forward by the French WEU Presidency. Accordingly, NATO allies with WEU Associate Member or Observer (Denmark) status would be entitled to fully participate in WEU decisions concerning missions requiring the use of Alliance infrastructures. That would not be the case, however, for WEU-led operations conducted without making recourse to NATO assets ('WEU-only', so to speak), to which 'normal' WEU procedures would apply. The WEU Permanent Council held in April 1997 finalized the agreement, and the new wording of the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997) implicitly incorporated it.
What remained to be defined, of course, were the exact modalities for the 'transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets' for use by the WEU in the former scenario. That would prove the most elusive component of the WEU-NATO interface: in order to prevent possible clashes in the event of a crisis, in fact, general principles had to be defined and applied in the drafting of crisis-specific bilateral agreements. The key elements were: (1) the nature and availability of such 'assets and capabilities'; (2) the timing at which they would become available and the duration for which they would remain available; (3) the conditions and/or restrictions put on their use (including monitoring and possible recall by NATO); and, finally, (4) the relevant financial and legal arrangements. Generally speaking, while the WEU demanded clear commitments, NATO (and especially the USA) was worried about being able to use the lent assets for possible concurrent operations. The problem involved less the 'capabilities' (in essence SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe], which currently numbers some 13,000 staff) than the 'assets', by which one could go as far as to mean strategic lift, intelligence, command, control and communication (nearly all US-owned). It must be pointed out, however, that a commonly agreed and stringent definition of those 'assets and capabilities' has been lacking since Berlin 1996. Whereas joint military planning and exercise practice were already developed -thus making the role of D-SACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) pivotal to 'WEU-led' operations -the extent to which US knowhow and materiel would be put (if ever) at the disposal of the Europeans without the US retaining some political and operational control over it remained a controversial issue. 8 At the end of 1998, in fact, negotiations were still stuck and, much as the common aim was to strike a deal before NATO's Washington Summit, the crisis in Kosovo made them all the more difficult. The only major achievement was the section of the communiqué of the Washington Summit (paragraph 9d) that acknowledged the EU's efforts and goals and pledged to 'ensure the fullest possible involvement' of non-EU European allies 'in EU-led crisis response operations' by 'building on existing consultation mechanisms between NATO and the WEU' [italics added]. As such, however, the paragraph only added to the ambivalence of the situation in that it paved the way to contrasting interpretations of its stringency (all the more so since the WEU was about to wither away). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that during the joint WEU-NATO exercise 'CRISEX 2000', held in February 2000, which simulated precisely such a contingency, the WEU's demand to borrow NATO assets and capabilities was apparently rejected. 9 For its part, the 1997 agreement on 'WEU-only' operations remained a dead letter and was soon overtaken by events, starting with the Cologne Declaration of June 1999.
Implications of (and for) the ESDP
The onset of the ESDP fundamentally shifted the terms of reference of European security policy. In essence, it meant a de facto 'EU-ization' of the ESDI and of those elements of the WEU that were not related to Article V mBT. Since Cologne, in particular, all the issues related to the ESDI and the 'Berlinplus' arrangements have become bilateral issues between the EU and NATO.
Unlike the WEU, however, the European Union is fundamentally different from the Atlantic Alliance in terms of nature, scope and even membership (though there are significant overlaps). For both organizations, military crisis management related to non-Article V/5 contingencies is only a part -and a relatively recent one at that -of their current activities and original mandate. For the EU, the ESDP has at the same time completed and complicated the range of its external policies. For NATO, peace support operations have provided a new policy field without doing away with its 'core business' of collective defence. The EU is a legal community with strong supranational elements -though weakest in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) -while NATO is a politico-military alliance based on intergovernmental decisions and flexible operational arrangements, combining established procedures and contingency-driven planning. Still in 1999, the WEU was militarily and operationally reliant on NATO -its autonomous capability being minimal (and in any case hardly put to use) -and politically subordinated to the EU. With its potential 'interface' function suppressed through the Cologne and Helsinki deliberations, 10 the Union and the Alliance were confronted with the problem of creating a direct bilateral link in the absence of a clearly agreed set of arrangements and common procedures to apply. Moreover, the reaction of the Clinton administration -whether through Madeleine Albright's famous '3 Ds' ('no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling') or William Cohen's repeated warnings of insufficient capabilities -further complicated the picture. On top of that, a US Senate resolution (no. 208, 106th Congress) passed in November 1999 went as far as stating that 'the EU should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its ESDI [sic] only after NATO had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the EU for action' [italics added]. Such 'right of first refusal' for the Alliance -as it was soon labelled -was not well received on the other side of the Atlantic and fuelled, in return, the claim of full 'decisionmaking autonomy' for the Union's ESDP.
As a result, the Helsinki Presidency Report (Annex IV.1) -after maintaining that the ESDP would avoid 'unnecessary duplication' -spoke of 'the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members', yet put them in the same basket as 'other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective members in EU-led crisis management'. It explicitly stated that, while they could participate 'if they so wish' in an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU European allies had to be 'invited' by the Council to take part in those 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'. At the same time, it granted 'the same rights and obligations as the EU participating member States in the day-to-day conduct' of such an operation for those countries that would deploy 'significant' military forces. 11 Last but not least, the Helsinki European Council decided to accept Turkey as a 'candidate' for EU accession, thus reversing the decision taken two years earlier in Luxembourg, but on the condition that all disputes with Greece be settled either bilaterally by 2004 or through the International Court of Justice at the Hague (something that Turkey had hitherto refused to do). The condition was indeed hard to swallow for Ankara, but its acceptance was made easier by the Greek-Turkish 'earthquake diplomacy' of the previous months and, above all, was largely compensated by the new prospects that the official 'candidacy' -actual negotiations would start only after satisfactorily meeting the so-called Copenhagen criteria -presented for the fraught relationship that Turkey had hitherto developed with the European Community 12 and for the modernizing forces in Turkish society. In turn, the Helsinki decision indirectly persuaded the government in Ankara not to forward to Parliament for ratification the death sentence promulgated a few months earlier against PKK leader Abdullah Oçalan, pending a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights.
In early 2000, however, a controversy erupted within the Union over the relative merits of special consultations either with the 13 accession candidates (to which could logically be added Norway and Iceland) or with the six non-EU European allies. The deadlock was broken in April through a compromise whereby both formats were adopted. Accordingly, the Feira European Council of June 2000 envisaged (1) 'exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities' and (2) 'a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU' [italics added]. In the emerging ESDP jargon, this meant that all non-EU members would be involved 'up-stream' (in decision-shaping, which entailed information, consultation and pre-planning) and 'downstream' (in implementation), but that decisionmaking proper and political control would pertain exclusively to the EU-15.
It was in this political situation -'EU-ization' of the ESDI, factual suppression of the WEU, latent transatlantic tensions over the ESDP, but also qualified acceptance of Turkey as a candidate to join the EU -that Ankara repositioned itself. On the one hand, it stepped up its military engagement in European security, by actively participating in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (K-FOR, summer 1999), by committing an additional sizeable force to the Helsinki Force Catalogue (Headline Goal-plus, November 2000) 13 and by appointing an army liaison officer to the Eurocorps in Strasbourg (March 2001) , similarly to what the UK and the Netherlands had previously done. On the other hand, it raised the stakes in the EU-NATO negotiations by demanding (1) that the use of NATO assets be decided only on a case-by-case basis; (2) that, by virtue of its strategic position and role, Turkey be not simply 'invited' but rather entitled to take part in EU operations where the EU would not use NATO assets (the fear that one or more EU members might veto the 'invitation' played an important role here); and (3) that it be involved on equal footing in their operational planning.
To be fair, the Helsinki and Feira decisions had indeed curtailed the 'assured access' of European NATO allies to EU-only operations as compared to the arrangements in place within the WEU. In particular, their eventual 'invitation' to join was de facto subject to a unanimous decision, whereas their eventual participation in a WEU-only operation was assured unless 'a majority' of full members decided otherwise: the two procedures are indeed quite different. At the same time, the communiqué of the Washington Summit, however interpreted, did not entail any guarantee of automatic and direct transfer of WEU arrangements into the ESDP.
Against this background, the Nice Presidency Report on the ESDP -and in particular Annexes VI-VII -represented a major effort by the EU to facilitate an agreement with NATO and Turkey. On the one hand, it sketched a more detailed picture of how EU 'crisis management' should work (combined with the simultaneous incorporation in the TEU of some of the institutional provisions adopted at Helsinki and afterwards). On the other, it acknowledged the 'special' position of the NATO-6 (even beyond the possible use of NATO assets) in that it envisaged an ad hoc 15+6 'format' and a structured bilateral framework for meetings at the political and military levels, including regular briefings for officers from the NATO-6 'accredited to the EU Military Staff' and specific liaison arrangements for NATO/EU exercises. Although it reiterated the point that the NATO-6 had to be 'invited' to take part in EU-only operations, it stated that 'for operations requiring recourse to NATO assets, the non-EU European allies will be involved in planning according to the procedures laid down in NATO' and even sketched a role of 'strategic coordinator' for D-SACEUR. Finally, it envisaged the setting up of a 'Committee of Contributors' for the day-to-day management of a given operation and stated that, much as the newly established Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS) of the EU would retain 'the political control and the strategic direction of the operation', it would 'take account of the views expressed' by the 'Committee of Contributors'.
However, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting of mid-December 2000, which took place a few days after Nice, failed to reach an agreement along such lines. It seems that, on the occasion of a 15+15 informal meeting of defence ministers in the run-up to Nice, the Cypriot representative manifested a strong interest in both committing forces to the Helsinki 'HG-plus' and seeing the fledgling European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as a potential peacekeeping force on the island, thus triggering Turkey's obstructive reaction at the NAC. 14 The expectation in Ankara that the new Republican administration would more warmly support (albeit indirectly) the Turkish position might also have contributed to the failure of the negotiations, apparently infuriating Madeleine Albright. In the following months, however, Turkish diplomacy showed some appreciation for the mediation efforts made by the British -Foreign Minister Ismail Cem made it clear that Turkey was willing to participate 'reasonably' in the ESDP 15 -and some flexibility on the terms of a possible bilateral 'understanding'. An informal British paper, in fact, accepted the concept of 'assured' access for the EU to some 'pre-determined' NATO assets, thus going beyond the initial case-by-case approach. It allegedly made a distinction between 'strategic' and 'non-strategic' assets: for the latter (which presumably include SHAPE), access would be automatic; for the former (including air refuelling and lift, intelligence, and command, control and communications), the EU would need approval from the NAC. Moreover, consultations between the EU-15 and the NATO-6 would be increased but not to the level of full participation demanded by Ankara. Finally, the paper apparently granted Turkey a sort of droit de regard (namely, a guarantee that no decision would be taken against its will and without its involvement) in its immediate 'geographical security environment': this apparently included Cyprus and the Aegean, but opinions differed still on its further reach. 16 Nonetheless, Turkish authorities eventually rejected the 'understanding'. This time, apparently, it was the National Security Council (and especially the military) that opposed the deal and forced Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to reject it, thus bringing the whole situation back to square one (or even further back). In fact, Turkey has continued to boycott joint EU-NATO military planning and has allowed allied experts to participate in 'Headline Task Forceplus' activities (the joint working group set to evaluate capability needs for the ESDP) only presidency-by-presidency and with recurrent delays. In the light of the 'suggestions' to that end incorporated in the Nice Presidency Report (Appendix to Annex VII), however, it is not entirely sure whether the EU, in turn, would have smoothly subscribed to the British paper. In fact, the 'understanding' did not make the assets and capabilities it needs most (the 'strategic' ones) easily available to the EU, while it assured access to those that would allow NATO to retain some strategic direction and military control over the ESDP. 
Allies and Future Partners
All six non-EU European allies have offered forces and assets ('additional voluntary contributions') to the Helsinki Headline Goal-plus, although none as many as Turkey. Yet nor have any of them -with the temporary exception of Poland (which until the spring of 2000 insisted on adopting all decisions on the ESDP at 15+6) -tried to raise as many difficulties and as stubbornly as Turkey. In other words, there has been no common 'six-pack' approach on EU-NATO military/security cooperation. Turkey's position is peculiar and can be explained also through the difficulties that the country is having with its EU membership bid, let alone the recent financial crisis or the persistent tensions over Cyprus. In fairness, it is also arguable that joint military planning is a quintessentially grey area in the relations between international security-related organizations. As a NATO member, in fact, Turkey would be fully involved in any planning at SHAPE for 'EU-led' operations making use of NATO 'assets and capabilities'. As a potential (and presumably generous) contributor to 'EU-only' operations, it would have a proportional say in their planning and conduct. In the former case, D-SACEUR -always a European, alternatively British or German -would probably be engaged in the implementation of the operational guidelines and would take into consideration the interests of all NATO members. In the latter, it might prove difficult to draw a clear line between the political control and strategic direction exercised by the PSC/COPS and the operational control exercised by the EU Military Committee and the 'Committee of Contributors'. Both military pre-planning by the EU Military Staff and the actual conduct of an operation would present Turkey with many substantial opportunities to participate in and influence decisions, although not on an equal formal footing with, say, Finland or Austria. 17 Yet the nature of military activities, the habits and reflexes of most European officers -usually trained by and socialized through NATO -and the priorities of some EU members are such that it is highly unlikely that the ESDP, at least at the present stage, will develop as an alternative or in contrast to NATO. On the one hand, almost all the national forces and capabilities committed to the ERRF are 'double-hatted', namely, answerable to both the EU and NATO. On the other, the eventual 'invitation' of non-EU European allies, and especially Turkey, would have to be considered by military planners at a very early stage of any force-generation exercise and mainly in the light of its operational added value, thus making traditional CFSP voting procedures less relevant. Actually (and paradoxically), the ERRF might even find itself in the positionto paraphrase the original ESDI concept -of being 'separate but not separable' from NATO, especially in the event of operations above the 'low end' of the 'Petersberg tasks'.
It is quite evident that Turkey has tried to capitalize on all the above -as well as on persisting US doubts and reservations about the ESDP -in order to strengthen its hand both inside NATO and in the ESDP framework. The risk, however, is that by making EU-NATO military/security cooperation difficult, or even impossible, Turkey ends up antagonizing both the US administration and the EU, finding itself politically isolated within NATO and fatally weakening its case for EU membership. The country also risks failing a testnamely, the one regarding full civilian control over the military -which all other NATO countries (old and new) and EU candidates have already passed. The Turkish military has intervened often on the political scene -seizing power directly in 1960 and 1980, and forcing the removal of governments in 1971 and 1997 -although it has traditionally been reluctant to do so or to participate directly in the civilian administration. The military still considers itself as the guardian of the secular and unitary structure of the state against Islamic radicalism and Kurdish separatism, and hardly acknowledges the primacy of elected top politicians when it comes to 'national security' (very broadly interpreted). The problem, of course, is also that Turkish citizens -owing to the legacy of 'Kemalism' -do not necessarily perceive the role and standing of their military as a liability. In the prospect of EU membership, it definitely is one, but in the realm of NATO, for instance, it is rather an asset, making Ankara a reliable ally and an important subregional actor. And for the military, paradoxically, Turkey's accession to the EU would entail the crowning of the process of Westernization initiated by Mustafà Kemal, but at the same time also the end of its own peculiar position and function. 18 Besides, the USA is becoming a relatively less important European partner for Ankara, due to the apparent 'benign neglect' increasingly shown by the new administration vis-à-vis a more active role of the Europeans in security and defence matters, including within NATO. The situation is quite different in the Middle East -by virtue of Turkey's 'special relationship' with Israel (a bilateral military cooperation agreement was signed in 1996) and proximity to the sanctuaries of international terrorism -and the Caucasus. However, both lie beyond the main areas of interest of the ESDP, at least for the moment. By contrast, the EU is becoming an increasingly important partner for Ankara, regardless of whether and when Turkey may join the Union. And this applies both to the economy of the country and to its immediate geographic 'neighbourhood'.
Finally, Turkey's conduct in this matter has raised a more fundamental problem of political style: European policymaking, and to a lesser extent that of NATO, requires a certain degree of flexibility and willingness to compromise in order to settle diverging (or just not entirely matching) national interests. Turkey has showed neither on this issue and very little on others, including Cyprus. Whether that is a sign of strength or weakness might be a moot point. In either case, persisting in such behaviour -acting as a demandeur on the one hand, taking political 'hostages' on the other -does not seem to be in the country's broader interest.
For its part, the EU has to acknowledge that Turkey is not simply a difficult partner for the ESDP but also a difficult candidate for accession. Unlike the Central Europeans, in fact, it has neither 'shadowed' CFSP decisions nor agreed to soften its stance on EU-NATO cooperation for the sake of its future membership of the Union. It is also still far from meeting the 'Copenhagen criteria' for starting accession talks, in spite of the tangible improvements of the past two years. Yet traditional 'conditionality' -direct or indirect -has had a limited effect on Ankara. The trouble is that such 'conditionality' works best when accession negotiations are in progress (or at least about to start), while the EU is still far from agreeing on the acceptability of a future Turkish membership, as even the tortuous implementation of the Customs Union signed in March 1995 has showed (the financial chapter is still blocked by Greece). Furthermore, at Nice, the Annex to the Treaty with the 'weighted' votes for all the candidates did not include Turkey at all, although some of the tentative schemes presented at the Intergovernmental Conference did. Failing a clear prospect of eventual membership, the Union's leverage is inevitably limited, especially insofar as the EU, too, is a demandeur vis-à-vis NATO.
Epilogue?
All this said, the whole issue looked as though it were nearing a solution in early December 2001. After another round of informal negotiations with British and US diplomats and a formal letter sent by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, Ecevit released an obliquely worded statement that indicated that Turkey was ready to accept the key elements of the 'understanding'. If accepted also by the entire EU, those elements would be incorporated in a formal exchange of letters between the Union and the Alliance that would clear the way towards the full 'operationality' of the ERRF. Besides, on exactly the same day, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities resumed their talks on the future of the island after a year-long impasse: along with pressure from the UN, the move was almost certainly dictated also by the prospect of Cyprus's entry in the EU by 2004 (and by Ankara's hope to have a say in its modalities), as envisaged by the report delivered by the European Commission in mid-November 2001. Here, too, Turkey's change of tack was remarkable in that just a few weeks earlier Ecevit had threatened to annex Northern Cyprus if the Union went ahead with enlargement without an agreement on the status of the island. 19 It is also worth noting that, although all these 'tables' (ESDP, enlargement, Cyprus) have been kept formally separated over the years, in the end they too proved hardly separable.
At any rate, after the NAC ministerial held on 6 December basically skipped the issue, the ball was now in the EU's court. The tentative deal, however, was clinched only a few days before the European Council in Laeken, at which the Belgian presidency of the Union planned to declare the ESDP 'operational'. On the one hand, therefore, especially Greece found itself confronted with a sudden 'take it or leave it' proposal that touched upon a very sensitive nerve in domestic politics. On the other, some EU countries -most notably the Netherlands -explicitly made their support for the Belgian plan conditional on the finalization of the deal with NATO. On top of that, the text of the agreement was leaked to the Greek press on the eve of the Laeken summit, thus making it all the more difficult for the government in Athens to subscribe to it right away. The upshot was just another apparent stalemate: the proposal did not collect the unanimous approval required at the EU level, although Greece did not 'veto' the agreement formally but managed simply to postpone the final decision by asking for a supplement of reflection and discussion. 20 As a result, Annex II to the Laeken Declaration, devoted to the 'operational capability' of the ESDP, stated that 'the EU is now able to conduct some crisis management operations' and 'will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop': a 'determining factor' in this sense will be represented precisely by 'the assets and capabilities available'. The text also explicitly praised the way in which the Union and the Alliance had been operating jointly in the Western Balkans, and reiterated that the EU 'intends to finalize the security arrangements with NATO and conclude the agreements on guaranteed access to the Alliance's operational planning, presumption and availability of preidentified assets and capabilities of NATO, and identification of a series of command options made available to the Union. These agreements', the text underlined, 'are essential for the ESDP and will substantially increase the Union's available capabilities' [italics added]. A closer look at the letter of what is now called the 'Istanbul Document' (subtitle: 'final version agreed by Ankara') -as published by the liberal daily Kathimerini on 11 December -shows how carefully words and formulations were drafted and crafted in order to reach an agreement acceptable to all sides and parties. First, the document never mentions Turkey, except in the subtitle: the terms for EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management, in other words, are laid down with reference to all non-EU European allies, thus meeting an essential Greek demand. Second, it states right at the beginning that 'in whatever crisis, ESDP will not be used against any ally' and 'will respect in every case the obligations of EU member States towards their NATO allies', thus meeting a key Turkish demand that dates back to the arrangement for Greece's accession to the WEU (see note 3 below). In addition, the document commits the EU to holding more frequent consultations with the NATO- 6, to creating opportunities for them to provide 'input' into the ESDP and be 'associated' to decisions and actions, to making them 'permanent interlocutors' of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and to assigning 'representatives' to the EU Military Committee. If crises occurred in the 'geographic proximity' of the European allies and affected their 'national security interests' -the document went on -the EU Council would engage in 'dialogue and consultation' with them and 'take into consideration' their positions insofar as allowed by Article 17 of the TEU. Finally, the NATO-6 would take the role of 'observers' for those operations they do not participate in if planned and coordinated by SHAPE. As for those 'EU-only' operations they were 'invited' to join, the 'Committee of Contributors' would become 'the main forum' for the management of such an operation once launched, with the PSC retaining political control as necessary. On the whole, the 'Istanbul Document' appears to be a viable basis for a final deal. There remain a few grey areas -especially the interpretation of the 'geographic proximity' and the boundaries between political and military control of a given operation -but these probably are inevitable, even indispensable, elements of the 'constructive ambiguity' that often drives policy formulation at the multilateral level. It may also prove necessary to clarify the frequency that 15+6 consultations should have -most European allies have complained that Russia, for instance, has just been granted monthly consultations with the EU on security issues -and the level at which the military 'representatives' should be (liaison officers, as still maintained in Nice, or higher). This time, however, there seem to be good reasons to think that an agreement will be finalized at the European Council in Seville (June 2002) at the latest. The main reason is that it is in everyone's interest, starting with Turkey, that the only secularized and democratic Muslim country find a firmer Western and European anchoring. 21 The EU's ESDP will benefit enormously from that, as will NATO, especially after the political setback the latter has suffered with the activation and the subsequent (very modest) implementation of its Article 5 provisions in the aftermath of 11 September. In a way, it is arguable that NATO may find a new raison d'être precisely in its partial 'ESDP-ization' -that is, its becoming an essential provider of military services for missions in the European area -while the ESDP may borrow from the Alliance the credibility it still lacks on the operational front. Furthermore, NATO may act (more or less explicitly) as a sort of 'deterrent of last resort' in case EU-led missions escalate militarily, while it will reassure politically all those (present and future) members of the Union that would prefer not to choose between European and transatlantic security organizations. Furthermore, a viable working arrangement between NATO and the EU would also make their further enlargements -both to be decided by the end of 2002, in Prague and Copenhagen respectively -more compatible with an effective ESDP. A final important ground for optimism is the calendar: a few months of further re-flection and refining of declarations would help prepare public opinion in Greece and foster progress on Cyprus, keeping in mind that June 2002 is definitely a deadline. Owing to Denmark's opting out, in fact, Athens will de facto take over the rotational presidency of EU affairs in all matters related to defence (and the euro) from July 2002 and hold it until June 2003. Once again, it is in everyone's interest -inside the EU as much as NATO -to have the issue solved in advance. 
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